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FROM:

JOHN G. ROBERTS

SUBJECT:

AFSCME �. Washington:
Comparable Worth Case

I have reviewed Judge Tanner's opinion in AFSCME v.
Washington, C82-465T (W.D. Wash 1983), the so-called "equal
pay for work of comparable worth" case. The opinion granted
back pay and injunctive relief under Title VII of the civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), to the
class of state employees in jobs primarily (defined as 70%
or more) held by women.
The theory of the plaintiffs,
accepted by the court, was not the traditional Title VII
theory that women were being paid less than men doing the
same or substantially the same work. The theory was not
"equal·pay for equal work."
Rather, plaintiffs argued and
the court agreed that the state violated Title VII because
workers in a class of jobs held primarily by women were paid
less than workers in a class of jobs held primarly by men,
even though the work in both classes of jobs was, according
to sociological studies admitted as evidence, "worth" the
same.
For example, most truck drivers are male and most laundry
workers female.
The sociologists, using a four-category
"point" system with points for knowledge and skills, mental
demands, accountability, and working conditions, determined
that driving a truck and working in the laundry are jobs of
comparable worth. The predominantly male truck drivers make
more than the predominantly female laundry workers, however,
and, according to Judge Tanner, that is sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII.
In his opinion Tanner recognized that the case was one of
first impression. He sought, however, to derive significant
support from the 1981 Supreme Court decision in County of
Washington�. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
In that case a
sharply divided Court ruled, 5-4, that female prison guards
hired to guard female prisoners could sue under Title VII,
alleging that they were discriminatorily paid less than male
prison guards hired to guard male prisoners.
Defendants had
argued that no violation of Title VII could be established,
since the female guards could not allege that they were paid
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less than a man hired to do the same job -- i.e., a male
guard hired to guard female prisoners (there was no such
person).
As noted, this argument was rejected by the
narrowest of margins.
Judge Tanner's huge leap from Gunther to a comparison of
totally dissimilar jobs such as those of truck drivers and
laundry workers has no basis in the language or logic of
Gunther.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Gunther
expressly noted that the claim in that case was "not based
on the controversial concept of 'comparable worth,' under
which plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the
basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty
of their job with that of other jobs in the same
Justice
organization or community." 452 U.S. , at 166.
Rehnquist's dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Stewart and Powell, pointed out the flaws in the
Court's opinion, but concluded that "its narrow holding is
perhaps its saving feature.
The opinion does not endorse
the so-called 'comparable worth' theory
"
Id., at 203.
•
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It is difficult to exaggerate the perniciousness of the
"comparable worth" theory.
It mandates nothing less than
central planning of the economy by judges. Under the theory
judges, not the marketplace, decide how much a particular
job is worth, and restructure wage systems to reflect their
determination.
The marketplace places a higher value on the
work of truck drivers than on that of laundry workers, but
Judge Tanner, under the guise of remedying gender
discrimination, concluded that both jobs are "worth" the
same and ordered that workers in both groups be paid the
same.
This is a total reorientation of the law of gender
discrimination.
Under the accepted view, if a qualified
woman wanted to become a truck driver, and was denied the
opportunity, or was given a job but paid less than a male
truck driver, she could seek relief under Title VII.
The
comparable worth theory, by contrast, offers relief to any
group of workers (either predominantly female or male) that
can convince a judge that their jobs are intrinsically
"worth" more than what they can command in the marketplace.
What this theory means in terms of judicial planning of our
economy is demonstrated by the frequent references in Judge
Tanner's opinion to the 1976-19 7 7 Washington state budget
surplus "that could have been used to pay Plaintiff's [sic]
their evaluated worth."
Slip op. , at 22; see also id.,
at 33.
A good sense of the type of jurist with which we are dealing
in this case is conveyed by the following quotation from the
opinion:
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Perhaps Defendant adopted the practices and concepts
of sex discrimination against women in employment as
just another manifestation of centuries old discrim
inatory attitudes and practices of a male dominated
society.
The Declaration of Independence probably
sheds some light on the practices and concepts of
sex discrimination so rampant in this country.
" . • . That
all men are created equal; That they are
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable
rights; That among these are Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness."
The female gender is
conspicuously absent in the Declaration of
Independence.
Slip op. , at 41.
The decision is being appealed to the Ninth Circuit by the
State of Washington.
No briefing schedule has yet been set.
The United States did not participate below; it can
participate as amicus in the Ninth Circuit, wait until the
almost inevitable petition for Supreme Court review of
whatever the Ninth Circuit decides, or not participate at
all.
I am advised that the Civil Rights Division will send
a recommendation to the Solicitor General in two-three
weeks.
I strongly suspect that recommendation will be that
the Government participate on the side of the State before
the Ninth Circuit.
Whether this makes political sense, when
there is the option of waiting until the case reaches the
Supreme Court, will have to be addressed at some level above
the Civil Rights Division.
As you doubtless know, the issue of possible participation
by the United States has already attracted considerable
media attention.
There is no need for action by our office
at this time, but we should be alert that the transition at
Justice does not result in this decision receiving anything
less than the most careful consideration, not only at
Justice but over here as well.

